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iv 
Abstract 
In recent years, natural gas has seen increased support in the context of climate change mitigation. 
Described as a ‘bridge fuel’ it is seen as aiding in the low-carbon energy transformation process. This is 
puzzling, given the high global warming potential of natural gas, which is composed almost entirely of 
the greenhouse gas methane. In this paper, we seek to explain the factors underpinning the political 
processes surrounding natural gas support, despite its unsuitability for climate mitigation. Drawing 
guidance from the pathways approach, and drawing on the broader institutional and regime literature, 
we analyse the role of actors and their networks, interests and politics as well as discourses and 
narratives. Our central claim is that support for natural gas is a result of institutional and incumbency 
lock-in, and has resulted from strategies that incumbent fossil fuel actors have deployed to secure their 
interests in the context of decarbonisation. We focus on liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure in 
Germany, a representative case study for understanding the dynamics of natural gas support. The paper 
concludes by highlighting further avenues of research. In particular, we note specific misperceptions 
that need to be more openly contested in the discourse surrounding natural gas, in order to address the 
issue of natural gas lock-in. 
Keywords: Lock-in mechanisms, pathways approach, politics of knowledge, discourses, actor networks, 
energy transitions, LNG, fossil gas, climate mitigation 
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1  Introduction 
Natural gas is being discussed as a ‘bridge fuel’ and ‘transition fuel’ in the light of increasing moves to 
restrict greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to mitigate climate change (Mac Kinnon et al. 2018; Neumann 
and Hirschhausen 2015), promoted especially by the natural gas industry (Goldthau et al. 2018). Natural 
gas is used across the globe in the energy sector, including in electricity, heating, transport and directly 
in industry. In Germany, the home of the historic Energiewende (low-carbon energy transformation) 
(Hirschhausen et al. 2018), increased political support can be observed for natural gas projects, including 
in technologies such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is puzzling, as across its full life cycle1, natural 
gas still emits substantial amounts of GHG and also other pollutants, with a significant degree of 
uncertainty about the exact extent (Alvarez et al. 2018) and there is evidence that methane 
concentration in the atmosphere has increased rapidly since 2007 (Nisbet et al. 2019).  
Natural gas is composed almost entirely of methane. Methane is a GHG with a global warming potential 
84 times more potent than CO2 over a 20-year time period and 28 times over a 100-year period (IPCC 
2014: 87). Analyses show that the potential of natural gas for absolute GHG emission reductions is at 
best small in the short-term and at worst actually increasing emissions (McGlade et al. 2018; Howarth 
2015; Howarth 2014; Anderson and Broderick 2017; Mac Kinnon et al. 2018; Alvarez et al. 2018; Davis 
and Shearer 2014). Nevertheless, significant new natural gas investments in pipelines, LNG terminals, 
power plants or for the transport sector are planned worldwide, leading to a further lock-in of fossil 
fuels. Discussions about extending gas consumption, in particular, centre on switching from coal to 
natural gas in the power sector. However, even this can lead to additional greenhouse gas emissions 
(Howarth 2014; Howarth 2015) and carbon infrastructure lock-in effects (Wilson and Staffell 2018). An 
additional issue in related discussions and analyses is the assumption of future availability of carbon 
capture, transport and storage technology (CCTS, also known as CCS).  
This latter systematic tendency to assume a technology that does not yet exist, strengthens the policy 
bias in favour of natural (fossil) gas. Much modelling of the costs for CCTS in decarbonisation scenarios 
for the European Union (EU) and globally are set erroneously low, such that models show this 
technology to begin use in 2020 on economic grounds alone (Mendelevitch et al. 2018). But this is not 
plausible either in any EU member state, nor worldwide. In the absence of additional climate policies 
regulating GHG emissions, many analyses show that this kind of reliance on natural gas could delay 
rather than accelerate decarbonisation efforts (Davis and Shearer 2014; Zhang et al. 2014). These 
studies have already shown that natural gas expansion plans would exacerbate negative climate impacts 
instead of mitigating climate change. Nevertheless, the trend towards natural gas is becoming ever 
more entrenched in many countries, with increasingly positive appraisals of and investments in new 
natural gas infrastructure.  
Our contribution is to analytically unpack the emerging dominant pathway of natural gas being framed 
as a decarbonisation approach. We show that the narratives surrounding natural gas in Germany are a 
politically and socially constructed outcome representing particular interests, not a physical reality 
necessary to combat climate change. Drawing on institutionalist approaches, and in particular work on 
lock-in mechanisms, we argue that support for gas has resulted from lock-in dynamics, and in particular 
strategies of incumbent energy players to protect their vested interests.  
Drawing conceptual guidance from the pathways approach (Leach et al. 2007), our theoretical approach 
also appreciates actors and networks, politics and interests as well as discourses and narratives, in 
 
1 Life cycle stages and related infrastructures that need to be included in an assessment are pre-production, natural gas 
production, transmission, distribution, storage, and well production end-of-life (Mac Kinnon et al. 2018). 
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explaining the policy processes surrounding natural gas in Germany. In particular, it focuses attention 
on investments in LNG terminals, which provide a useful example for analysing the dynamics 
underpinning expansion of gas dependency within the German case. The surrounding narrative of 
natural gas as a ‘bridge’ or ‘transition’ fuel can limit wider debates about other possible roles that it 
might actually play (Stephenson et al. 2012). This is especially relevant in considering carbon budget 
constraints under the Paris Agreement. 
As it currently stands, there is little attention on issues of natural gas lock-in and expansion, either within 
social science research or in commentaries from civil society.2 With this paper, we aim to contribute to 
addressing this gap. Given that this paper is the first of its kind in focusing on natural gas support in 
Germany, its central contribution lies in providing an overview of the key dynamics underpinning the 
policy processes of natural gas in Germany. The policy relevance is high due to the potential long-term 
impacts of a lock-in to natural gas and related negative climate impacts (Anderson and Broderick 2017). 
In particular, we focus on the mismatch between the implications of climate science on natural gas and 
the scale of German infrastructural developments in this sector. By interrogating the vested interests 
involved in this case and further processes of lock-in around the industrial fossil fuel complex, we hope 
to provide critical data for understanding and contesting this emerging energy pathway.  
As for academic relevance, we hope to contribute to the broader literature concerning the factors that 
support and inhibit energy transitions (Araújo 2014; Geels et al. 2016; Turnheim et al. 2015; Markard et 
al. 2012; Grubler 2012). In particular, we note that as coalitions and relations between state institutions 
and incumbents inhibit radical transitions they deserve special attention (Johnstone and Newell 2018; 
see also Stirling (2018) for an approach to analyse incumbency). As such, we focus on the lock-in effects 
of incumbent regimes, the material and political dimensions of this, and what this can mean for 
renewable energy transitions. In this regard, Germany, given its progress in transitioning to renewables 
and away from fossil and nuclear sources of energy, provides an interesting case for examining dynamics 
of incumbent energy corporations, their relationships with the state, and strategies they employ to 
stabilise existing regimes and protect their interests. With this paper, we look at the incumbency of 
natural gas, related actors and their relationship with policymakers and how this influences natural gas 
investments.  
To understand the discussion of natural gas in Germany, some background on the specifics of natural 
gas markets is necessary. Important for energy questions is especially the ‘nexus’ between markets, 
security and climate change (Kuzemko et al. 2018). As natural gas trade often takes place outside of the 
public sphere, discrepancies occur between statements of public officials and market realities. 
Germany, and in fact most of the European Union, is increasingly dependent on imported pipeline gas 
as well as LNG. Germany’s natural gas supply comes mostly from Russia, Norway and the Netherlands, 
but also Algeria and the Caspian region (IEA 2018).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework employed, 
and notes the central factors posited to underpin policy processes. Section 3 is the case study, with the 
analysis of the proposed locations for the construction of LNG terminals in Germany, and the actors 
involved in each instance. The paper then turns to the discussion of these cases in Section 4, with 
reference to our theoretical claims, finding evidence that the support for natural gas results from lock-
in dynamics. Finally, the paper concludes by noting further avenues of research.  
 
2 For exceptions, please see: Anderson and Broderick (2017), Oil Change International (2016), Trout et al. (2017), 
Stockman et al. (2018), Physicians for social responsibility (2017), initiatives by the German Nature  Conservation 
Ring (DNR 2018), CAN Europe or Friends of the Earth (Friends of the Earth Europe 2017), and Food and Water 
Europe (food&water europe 2016).  
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2 Theoretical Background and Methodology 
Our theoretical framework takes guidance from Keeley and Scoones’ (2003) synthesis, pointing out in 
contrast with conventional views, that policy processes are not linear, but rather messy and contested. 
In the following, the four central elements of the framework are discussed.  
2.1 The Institutional and Regime Dimension 
Broader institutionalist theories highlight how institutional dynamics lead to particular outcomes. In 
particular, the framework by Keeley and Scoones (2003) notes that given path dependency, there are 
strong incentives to stay on the existing trajectory. In this case, solutions that favour the status quo of 
the existing fossil fuel regime will be preferred. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-
carbon transitions, and in particular incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions 
(Geels 2018). It is argued that the different elements of such a complex system – the material, 
organisational and conceptual dimensions of the system (Sandén and Hillman 2011) – are aligned with 
each other and as such the existing sociotechnical system has a stabilising influence on innovation 
dynamics and technological change and prevents the introduction of radically new technological 
trajectories (Klitkou et al. 2015). The central mechanism of this is lock-in effects, conceptualised as 
mechanisms which reinforce a certain pathway of economic, technological, industrial and institutional 
development and can lead to path-dependency (ibid.). Lock-in refers to infrastructures, but also more 
generally to the integration into the economy and, hence, the prevention of deeper social change away 
from fossil fuels (Castán Broto 2018).  
Keeley and Scoones argue that policy processes can be explained by looking at discourses and 
narratives, politics and interests, as well as actors and the networks within which they are located. To a 
greater or lesser extent, understanding policy processes therefore comes as a result of looking at all 
three together – at the intersection of the three overlapping perspectives ((IDS 2006), see Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: Main Factors Influencing Policy Processes 
 
 Source: Keeley and Scoones 2003 
Noting however that this framework is best understood as a selection of prompts to ask useful questions 
of policy (IDS 2006), we also draw on broader and complementary interdisciplinary perspectives such 
as insights from neo-institutional theories – in particular the concept of path dependency, including 
infrastructural path dependency. These perspectives are weaved through the discussions of each of the 
three lenses, and are addressed in a concluding section. In this way, we can further the understanding 
of the interplay of very material politics, but also a politics of knowledge (Scoones et al. 2015: 5).  
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2.2 Discourses and Narratives 
Policy discourse can be considered causally significant in shaping policy change. Discourse can be 
defined as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities’ (Hajer 1995 as cited in Keeley and Scoones 2003: 37). The concepts that are part of 
environmental discourse (the ‘knowledge’) are intertwined with practices, institutional capacities and 
technologies, or form part of this (Feindt and Oels 2005: 163). Important to understand is that 
fundamentally, discourses are frames that define the world in certain ways; in the process, they exclude 
alternative interpretations (Schram 1993; Apthorpe and Gasper 1996; and Grillo and Stirrat 1997 as 
cited in Keeley and Scoones 2003: 37). These combine to form ‘policy narratives,’ which provide both a 
diagnosis and a set of measures and interventions (IDS 2006: 10). They define a problem, explain how 
it comes about and show what needs to be done to avert disaster or bring about a happy ending (Leach 
et al. 2010: 130).  
Often particularly simple narratives gain traction, due to the way in which they simplify complex issues 
in a way appealing to politicians (IDS 2006: 10). Most fundamentally, we focus on how such narratives 
become adopted as ‘truth’ because of social processes, rather than because of a realist belief that such 
narratives reflect biophysical reality as uncovered by science (Forsyth 2003: 96). This then is about 
politics around knowledge production in debates about green transformations, turning both on what 
we think we know (consensus and uncertainties) and on who knows it (whose knowledge counts) 
(Scoones et al. 2015: 4). The narratives become embedded in particular institutional structures, 
bureaucracies or actor-network groups (IDS 2006: 11). This then, takes on its own path dependency, in 
which norms of behaviour and understandings are locked-in.  
2.3 Actors and Networks  
Actors and the networks within which they organise are significant in accounting for policy change and 
development. Actors are characterised by specific capabilities, specific perceptions and specific 
preferences (Scharpf 1997). Networks, coalitions and alliances of actors (individuals or institutions) with 
a shared vision – similar belief systems, codes of conduct and established patterns of behaviour – are 
important in spreading and maintaining narratives through chains of persuasion and influence such as 
journals, conferences, education or informal introductions (IDS 2006: 11). We must ask which scientists 
or other stakeholders, which forms of expertise, from the official to the informal, which disciplines and 
which regions have most voice in the construction of knowledge about the predicaments that underpin 
calls for green transformations (Scoones et al. 2015: 4).  
The actor networks that coalesce around such large-scale, technology-led solutions revolve around 
scientists-engineers and associated research funders whose commitment to technological solutions is 
paramount (Schmitz and Scoones 2015: 19). Through these networks ‘norms of good and bad practice 
are reinforced, research agendas are set, and orthodoxies or conventional wisdoms are reiterated and, 
very often, dissenting opinions or unconventional views are suppressed’ (IDS 2006: 11). Actor networks 
are not exclusively confined to state institutions, rather they link up parts of the bureaucracy and 
government with the private sector, donors and actors in civil society – such as journalists, researchers 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Leach et al. 2010: 131). The strategies that such actors 
pursue, and how stakeholder groups interact and behave within the constraints of a particular 
institutional design, are of particular interest.  
2.4 Politics and Interests  
In understanding policy process, it is also important to note that the political context is moulded by the 
interests of particular regime authorities to remain in power (IDS 2006). In the case of decarbonisation, 
this can be seen in fossil fuel players as seeking to stabilise the fossil fuel regime. Within all policymaking 
there exist power dynamics and inequalities. Politics and power are important to how pathways are 
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shaped, which pathways win out and why, and who benefits from them (Scoones et al. 2015: 3). 
Understanding the impact of this politics of interests involves analysing how such positions are asserted, 
commercial-political interests are deployed, and alliances for or against change are formed (Scoones 
2016: 295). In the case of the shift to support gas infrastructure in Germany, the key factor to analyse 
then is the vested interests at play: who stands to gain, and how and in what ways they sought to 
influence policy in line with their interests – and to what extent this is then reflected in policy decisions 
– are crucial lines of inquiry. In the case of fossil fuels, which also have a material structure, the dynamics 
of the built environmental are also significant. When infrastructures, incentives and interests combine 
they can be difficult to shift (Schmitz and Scoones 2015). Powerful, incumbent forces and historical lock-
ins of political, commercial or technical interests mean that in some settings transformations are 
especially challenging (Scoones 2016: 301). These cumulative influences affect each stage of the 
process, from agenda setting, to the identification of alternatives, weighing up the options, choosing 
the most favourable and implementing it (IDS 2006: 13).  
The frames of Keeley and Scoones help give guidance on what elements mediate the impacts of lock-in 
dynamics. They enable us to analyse the development of dominant pathways and the processes by 
which technologies that are incompatible with the dominant technological regime are locked out 
(Klitkou et al. 2015). As such we focus on the role of lock-in, not only how incumbent regimes block, but 
also the strategies they employ towards solutions that favour regime stabilisation.  
Centrally we argue that the shift of support for natural gas is a case of lock-in, explained by strategising 
of traditional incumbents in reaction to destabilisation of their related dominant market position in the 
context of climate mitigation. Drawing on the pathways approach and the conceptual guidance 
provided, we examine actors and their networks, narratives and discourses, as well as politics and 
interests. We conducted a first basic literature review mostly based on primary data in German and 
English provided by corporations, network operators, politicians and so on, as well as on secondary 
literature consisting of peer reviewed journals. In the following step we identified the relevant actors 
involved. Subsequently, we clustered them in consistent actor groups and researched in a more in-depth 
analysis the most relevant stakeholders of these groups. In that step we identified their interests, 
narratives used and their linkages. 
3 Case Study: LNG Terminals in Germany 
LNG terminals mainly enable imports to countries where pipeline deliveries are not feasible.3 The 
utilisation of LNG has increased strongly since the first delivery between Algeria and the United Kingdom 
in 1964 (Rüster 2010). Despite the availability for more than 50 years and first discussions about an 
import terminal in Germany in the 1970s, no investment decision for an LNG import terminal was ever 
taken. LNG itself can either be used directly, or regasified and used in pipelines. On an EU-wide level, 
the utilisation rate of existing LNG infrastructure was less than 25 per cent in 2017 (ACER and CEER 
2018). 
Despite these large overcapacities, a shift in political support for LNG terminals can be observed, with 
regional, federal and state governments pledging both political and financial support to the projects 
(see section 3.2.3). As of January 2019, there were three potential locations for large-scale LNG 
terminals in Germany, all in the north of the country: Brunsbüttel, (Schleswig-Holstein) Wilhelmshaven 
and Stade (both located in Lower Saxony). The three cities are now in a race to secure themselves as 
the location of the first terminal in Germany (Wieschemeyer 2018). 
 
3 Natural gas is liquefied and then transported on a ship to an import terminal.  
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With our choice of the LNG terminals as a case study, we focus this analysis on the pro-gas pathway, as 
it is currently dominant in public and political discourse. We ground this paper in the fact that this 
dominance cannot be attributed to a need to expand gas infrastructure. Studies show that the phase-
out of coal and gas in Germany in combination with further expansion of renewable energy 
infrastructure and storage capacity is possible until 2030 (Oei et al. 2019). 
3.1 LNG Terminal Investments 
3.1.1 Wilhelmshaven  
Since the 1970s, Wilhelmshaven has been under consideration as a potential location for an LNG 
terminal in Germany. Although there was repeated interest in the project, it has not been realised so 
far. In 2018, the leading partners in Wilhelmshaven were still having difficulties finding potential 
investors, despite the support of the regional government.  
 
Since 1972, Deutsche Flüssiggas Terminal GmbH has been planning the construction and operation of 
an LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven. The company owns suitable land as well as the needed rights of use 
for an existing jetty (Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr 2017). The 
corporation is 90 per cent owned by Uniper. The company sees itself more as a purchaser and reseller 
of LNG in Wilhelmshaven than as an investor. The leading partners of the project are: Nord-West 
Ölleitung GmbH (NWO), HES Wilhelmshaven GmbH, Deutsche Flüssigerdgas Terminal, and Uniper 
(BMWi 2018). NWO is a service provider for oil transit and aims to diversify and secure its core business, 
which is mainly the import of crude oil for the refinement plants owned by their shareholders (Abeldt 
2018). HES Wilhelmshaven is Germany’s largest independent liquid bulk terminal, for products such as 
crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas.  
 
Wilhemshaven is already connected to the gas transmission grid as well as to storage capacities, and 
approval procedures for the construction of an LNG terminal have already been completed 
(Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr 2015). The deep-water port allows 
the landing of large LNG tankers. The potential size of the terminal ranges between 10 and 14 billion 
cubic metres (bcm) and could go into operation in 2022 (Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Arbeit und Verkehr 2018; Wadewitz 2018). 
 
The latest construction cost estimate for a shore-side supply-strategic LNG import terminal is, according 
to Deutsche Flüssiggas Terminal, approximately €1.5bn; whereas the construction of a Floating Storage 
and Regasification Unit (FSRU) would be less expensive according to NWO, i.e. around €130m.4 
Additional to this is the cost of providing the FSRU, which can cost tens of millions of euros 
(Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr 2015). For the FSRU option, 
Wilhelmshaven attracted the Japanese shipping company Mitsui O.S.K. Lines as an investor (Wadewitz 
2018). The shipping company is one of the largest worldwide. Additionally, the location hopes for 
investments from Qatar, the world’s largest producer of LNG (Maksimenko 2018b).  
 
3.1.2 Stade 
Since the beginning of 2018, Stade has been under consideration for building an LNG terminal. Dow 
Germany and LNG Stade GmbH are the two project partners involved. Dow Germany is part of the 
American company The Dow Chemical Company and claims to consume with its chemical parks about 
1 per cent of total German electricity production, making it one of the country’s largest energy 
consumers. 
 
The Australian investor Macquarie has already signed a letter of intent to finance the terminal. 
Macquarie is part of the Macquarie Group, a financial services company and one of the world's largest 
 
4 €100m for the docking station and €30m for the gas grid connection. 
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asset managers and investors for infrastructure projects. The Chinese group China Harbour Engineering 
Construction is also part of the shareholder group and is examining the takeover of construction work. 
However, the final investment decision requires outstanding internal and external audits (Maksimenko 
2018a). 
 
The LNG terminal is planned with an annual capacity of approximately 4 bcm, which can be expanded 
to up to 12 bcm. For the first stage, €400m to €500m in costs are estimated (Handelsblatt 2018). Dow 
already has the necessary pipelines to feed natural gas into the German grid and could supply waste 
heat for regasification (NDR1 Niedersachsen 2018a). The proximity to Hamburg is also seen as a location 
advantage. According to the project partners, they already have two customers for the LNG: The 
resident company Aluminium Oxide Stade GmbH (AOS) and Uniper (NDR1 Niedersachsen 2018b). The 
Dow Group receives political support from the Trump administration (NDR1 Niedersachsen 2018a) for 
the project.5 
 
3.1.3 Brunsbüttel 
In the case of Brunsbüttel, the project coordinator German LNG Terminal GmbH is responsible for the 
project. Shareholders of German LNG Terminal are the two Dutch firms, Gasunie LNG Holding B.V. and 
Vopak LNG holding B.V., as well as Oiltanking GmbH, which belongs to the Mabanaft Group. Mabanaft 
Group is the trading division of Hamburg-based Marquard & Bahls AG and specialises in oil trading, but 
the company is also involved in liquid gas trading. Gasunie is a gas infrastructure company working in 
the Netherlands and northern Germany. Vopak is a liquid fuel terminal operator, which also owns LNG 
regasification terminals in the Netherlands and Mexico. 
 
According to German LNG Terminal, the terminal in Brunsbüttel should be completed in 2023 and have 
an annual capacity of 5 bcm. Seven bcm of feed-in capacity have already been registered (Lycklama à 
Nijeholt 2018). RWE AG signed an agreement guarantying the corporation access to a ‘substantial share 
of the prospective terminal's annual capacity’ (RWE Supply & Trading GmbH 2018). RWE is one of the 
biggest energy utilities in Germany.  
 
An application for exemption from network access and charges regulation pursuant to Section 28a 
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (energy industry law)has already been submitted for Brunsbüttel 
(Bundesnetzagentur 2018).6 In addition, Brunsbüttel is the only one of the three locations which has 
been included in the Network Development Plan Gas 2018-2028 of the Federal Network Agency (FNA), 
Germany’s energy regulator. In 2018, an application was submitted to the Federal Ministry of Transport 
under the Mobility and Fuels Strategy (MFS) of the Federal Government. An application for GRW7 
funding is yet to be made (Lycklama à Nijeholt 2018). 
 
3.1.4 Small-scale Terminals  
Additionally, there are several smaller-scale LNG terminals planned: one in Rostock, also as an import 
terminal, and two pilot inland LNG terminals to be constructed by June 2021 (ten are planned in total 
so far). The EU funds the inland projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) with ‘[t]he overall 
objective […] to promote the use of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as fuel for inland navigation and road 
 
5 At the official handover of a funding application for the project to the Federal Ministry of Economics, the US 
Ambassador Richard A. Grenell was present (Penz 2018).  
6 New infrastructure investments can, subject to defined conditions, be exempted from existing regulatory 
provisions for a limited period of time. 
7 The GWR (community task to improve the regional economic structure) funding pool serves to improve the 
economy in structurally weak regions. ‘Business enterprises and the tourism industry are entitled to apply for 
investment projects that are particularly worthy of economic support, as well as municipalities, municipal 
associations and other entities that pursue tax-privileged purposes or are not geared to generating profit, in the 
case of economic infrastructure measures’ (BMWi. 2018b; GRW 2018). 
8 
 
freight transport’. The construction in Duisburg (on the Rhine) started in August 2017. The company 
responsible, LIQUIND 24/7 GmbH, received €3.3m to build ten LNG fuelling stations. LIQUIND wants to 
start an LNG distribution network, consisting of distribution terminals and gas stations for heavy-duty 
trucks and inland waterway vessels (LIQUIND 2018). While this infrastructure is already advanced in 
other EU countries, it is new for Germany.  
3.2 Findings 
In the following sections, we analyse actors related to the above-mentioned LNG projects and natural 
gas infrastructure more generally, not claiming that the following illustration of actors is complete. 
However, it is a broad overview to gain an understanding of the complexities, and also of the joint 
underlying interests and discourses. We structure the following section by actor groups and discuss in 
each subsection their related discourses and interests.  
One can see science as an additional actor group in the context of fossil gas. However, the scientific 
community cannot be considered as a homogenous actor group, with consistent interests and 
narratives, and for that reason cannot be grasped in our analytical framework. In general, an increase 
in publications on fossil gas can be observed which range from phase-out to an increase in natural gas 
support, varying across institutions and also countries.  
3.2.1 Suppliers  
The main supplier for natural gas in Germany is Russia. According to estimates by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), in 2017 Germany imported 72 bcm (60 per cent) from Russia, 13 bcm (11 per cent) 
from Norway and 34 bcm (29 per cent) from other countries (IEA 2018).8 The historic dependence on 
Russia for natural gas deliveries, and especially conflicts over supply disruptions since 2006, have led to 
aims to reduce import dependence on Russia, to increase supply diversification and, in general, energy 
security debates (Richter and Holz 2015; Neumann et al. 2018). 
Dutch natural gas supply reductions further increased fears of a dependency on Russian gas (Holz et al. 
2017). While natural gas has until now been delivered entirely via pipelines, an import LNG terminal 
would open the German market for new suppliers, especially from Australia and Qatar, the USA, but 
also Africa and South America (Office of the Chief Economist 2018). 
Most visible in the debate has been the USA, openly pushing the EU, but also Germany (as a major 
consumer and transit country) more specifically, to commit to buying US natural gas (European 
Commission 2018b). The USA is increasing its efforts to enter the European gas market (Goldthau et al. 
2018), as Europe would be one of the important markets for the USA’s intention to become one of the 
largest LNG exporters. Conflicts have arisen especially regarding the plan to build a new pipeline 
between Russia and Germany (Nord Stream 2), giving Russia even greater access to the EU natural gas 
market (Neumann et al. 2018). Geopolitical tensions between the USA and Russia also play an important 
role in decisions on natural gas contracts and new infrastructure projects.  
Australian and Qatari investors and supplier firms (Australian Macquarie Group and Qatar Petroleum) 
are involved in the proposals for German LNG terminals. Relevant in this context is that Qatar exited the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in November 2018, enabling the country to 
increase natural gas and oil production. It is already the biggest LNG supplier to the EU. The main 
contributing factor to the growth in Australian emissions has been LNG dedicated for exports, with an 
expected growth of 200 per cent between 2015 and 2020 (Climate Analytics 2018). 
These suppliers consist of complex networks of different private and state actors, with diverse interests 
and power. For this analysis, however, it is sufficient to note that there are a range of LNG suppliers 
 
8 35 bcm were re-exported to other countries. 
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with an interest in entering the German (and EU) market, and on the other hand pipeline gas suppliers 
which have an interest in keeping their market share and high natural gas prices. Especially in the case 
of the USA and Russia, conflicts run a lot deeper than just natural gas contracts and related revenues. 
Related discourses repeated in media articles are mainly about supply security, cheaper gas prices and 
supply diversification.  
3.2.2 Demand for Natural Gas  
The current demand for natural gas is dominated by the residential and commercial sector for direct 
natural gas consumption (especially for heating), the electricity sector and industry (especially the 
chemical industry but also, for example, for steel production) (IEA 2018). Another sector that is currently 
being discussed as a potential major consumer is the transport sector, mainly for shipping (inland and 
overseas) and heavy-duty trucks (BMVI 2016).  
Related relevant actors with an interest in LNG are therefore energy utilities, energy-intensive 
corporations and chemical industry producers, the shipping industry, harbours, as well as heavy-duty 
trucks and related logistic companies.  
Utilities need to contract natural gas for electricity generation with their gas-fired power plants. RWE 
and Uniper, for example, have announced they are going to buy capacity at LNG terminals. Dow is the 
equivalent example of a chemical company trying to secure favourable natural gas contracts, but also 
being directly involved in the construction of the LNG terminal.  
The first LNG gas station used for trucks was opened in September 2018 in Hamburg, operated by Shell 
(German Foreign Policy 2018). It is supported by the LNG Task Force founded by, amongst others, the 
German Energy Agency (DENA) under the patronage of the Federal Ministry of Transport (BMVI) as a 
‘cross-sectoral initiative for low-emission mobility’ (DENA 2018). The potential demand growth of the 
transportation sector, especially due to tighter emission regulations, is used as an argument for LNG 
investments for the shipping and road industry (see, for example, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) or the German Energy Agency). For shipping, tighter emission regulations on sulphur 
by the IMO will restrict the use of current fuels, mainly heavy oil, from 2020 onwards (Parkin and 
Shiryaevskaya 2018). 
The transport industry is well connected with other energy-intensive industries, fuel sellers and gas 
station operators, and related lobby institutions (for more on these networks and their influence see 
Section 3.2.6). For trucks and personal vehicles, there is also a push for natural-gas-powered 
automobiles, with the narrative of gas being the environmentally friendly alternative (Zukunft Erdgas 
e.V. 2018a).  
The discourse pushed for by the corporations and associations involved in natural gas circles is again 
around LNG being ‘environmentally friendly’ and ‘green’. The underlying interests lie in the potential 
monetary gains or losses in new investments and the competitiveness of the affected industries. LNG-
fuelled ships are much costlier than conventional ships today (Saul and Chestney 2018). If LNG ships are 
to advance not only will shipping companies need to invest in new ships or reconstruction, but a fuel 
station system will also need to be developed again leading to substantial lock-in effects once the 
investments have been made. However, LNG is the option for emission reductions that is most aligned 
to the old system and configurations, and therefore includes most players of the existing networks (gas 
stations, turbines, suppliers (which trade with both oil and gas) and so on). 
3.2.3 State Actors 
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Germany's energy policy must be viewed in the light of the European Union. Since the 1980s, there has 
been a growing effort to create a joint European energy market. The integration of the gas market and 
the encouragement of private investments play an important role. Gas is seen as a key energy source 
for the EU in the coming decades. The narratives for the use of LNG are based in particular on energy 
security as well as competitiveness, and compliance with the EU’s sustainability objectives (European 
Commission 2016a). LNG infrastructure expansion is portrayed as necessary to ensure that all Member 
States have access to gas markets (ibid.). In particular, regions in South East Europe, Central Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic States are considered for financial support in order to expand their infrastructure.  
According to the EU, these countries do not have access to LNG and/or are heavily dependent on a 
single gas supplier and would therefore be hit the hardest in case of a supply crisis. The EU, however, 
already has a considerable LNG import capacity – sufficient to cover around 43 per cent of its current 
gas demand (as of 2015) (European Commission 2016b). The Commission’s narrative, to justify the 
expansion and, in particular, the subsidisation of infrastructure, is that LNG terminals are not optimally 
distributed across the EU. According to the Commission, this is one of the contributing factors to the 
vulnerability of certain Member States’ energy security.  
 
In total, subsidies amounting to €638m were paid or committed for LNG infrastructure projects between 
2013 and 2018 (European Commission 2018a). Geopolitical interests also play an important role at EU 
and national level for the political and financial support of the construction of a German LNG terminal. 
 
With regard to the need for an LNG terminal in Germany, federal and state governments have changed 
their position considerably in recent months. Still in 2017, according to the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Energy, an own LNG terminal was not considered to be in Germany’s interest. Access to LNG 
via neighbouring states such as Belgium (Zeebrugge), the Netherlands (Rotterdam), and Poland 
(Świnoujście), or other European countries, was seen as sufficient (BMWi 2017). Then in 2018, Peter 
Altmaier, Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy  welcomed the construction of several 
terminals and the construction of an LNG terminal was included in the latest party coalition agreement 
(CDU, CSU und SPD 2018).  
In 2015, Lower Saxony's government argued that the installed pipeline infrastructure was sufficient and 
that LNG was not economically viable (Niedersächsischer Landtag 2015). However, in 2017, the 
construction of an LNG terminal on the North Sea coast was part of the coalition agreement of the state 
government. Here, the narrative was that LNG could take over a systemic function within the German 
gas supply. In addition, positive economic and labour market relevant effects were expected. Lower 
Saxony aims to encourage the federal government to participate in the financing for strategic reasons 
(Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr 2017). In Schleswig-Holstein, the 
state government is also strongly committed to the construction of a terminal and considers the project 
‘top priority’.9 The coalition agreement of the Conservative, Liberal and Green government also states 
that it will ensure that the LNG terminal in Brunsbüttel is promoted.  
According to the law on electricity and gas supply (EnWG §15a Abs.1), the Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs) have to draw up a joint Germany-wide Network Development Plan (NDP) every two 
years. The NDP is based on a scenario framework which the private operators of transmission networks 
submit to the Federal Network Agency in the previous year and which the latter needs to confirm. The 
scenario framework for the Network Development Plan for Gas 2018-2028 is based on two scenarios. 
In both scenarios, German gas demand will not decrease enough by 2028 compared to 2015 to meet 
German greenhouse gas reduction targets of 55 per cent by 2030. The first scenario assumes a reduction 
 
9 The prime minister himself has invited representatives from politics and business to visit the Rotterdam LNG 
terminal. 
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of 43 per cent, while the second scenario assumes 50 per cent (Prognos 2017). The Federal Network 
Agency has nevertheless confirmed the scenario framework (Bundesnetzagentur 2017). 
Decision-makers at all political levels favour the construction and subsidisation of an LNG terminal in 
Germany. This position is justified in particular by the narratives of security of supply and a presumably 
higher demand for LNG in the mobility sector – contrary to compliance with the national climate targets, 
which are not respected in any scenario of the Federal Network Agency’s NDP. At the state level, a 
positive effect on the regional economy is anticipated. 
At both EU and federal level, network operators have a major impact on the design of NDPs, being given 
privileged access to decision-makers (see Section 3.2.4). This puts them in a position to enforce their 
interests at the political level. These networks can be further strengthened at EU and national level 
through well-organised stakeholder associations and intervention in the national discourse through 
well-financed campaigns (see Section 3.2.6). 
3.2.4 Network Operators  
In Germany, there are over 700 network operators – most of them Distribution Network Operators. 
These are partly private service companies or municipal actors (for example, municipal utilities). There 
are 16 Transmission System Operators (TSOs). As already described in Section 3.2.3, the TSOs draw up 
the NDP and are obliged to base ‘reasonable’ assumptions on the development of extraction, supply 
and consumption of gas and its exchange with other countries (EnWG 2018). 
 
The association of German gas TSOs promotes natural gas as a ‘safe and environmentally friendly’ 
alternative to other fossil fuels and as the strongest growing energy source in Germany and Europe (FNB 
Gas 2018). 
 
The planning of grid expansion at the EU level is organised similarly to Germany. ENTSOG, an association 
of European gas transmission system operators, many of which are private service companies, is 
responsible for the modelling of future EU gas consumption and sources, and every two years for the 
development of an unbinding community-wide Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). This plan 
lists all infrastructure projects which the network operators themselves consider relevant from a 
commercial or security of supply point of view. 
 
The TYNDP 2018 includes 29 LNG-terminal-related projects, among them the LNG terminal in 
Brunsbüttel. All projects that are included in the TYNDP can apply to become a Project of Common 
Interest (PCI) (Official Journal of the European Union2013: 347). Projects that are on the PCI list benefit 
from accelerated approval procedures, faster and better streamlined environmental impact assessment 
and, under certain conditions, are subsidised with EU funds (European Commission 2017). 
 
Transmission system operators recently commissioned a study that analyses the potential contribution 
from gas grids to the energy transition. The study argues that gas grids retain their importance in 
providing consumers with ‘green gas’ (Frontier Economics 2017). However, the use of so-called 
synthetic gas to the extent of the current use of natural gas is unlikely due to the high conversion costs. 
Synthetic gas is more likely to be used in areas where electrification is difficult to achieve (for example, 
in air traffic) (DIW Berlin, Wuppertal Institut and Ecologic Institut 2018). 
 
Gas network operators are keen to ensure that the gas network continues to be perceived as an 
important infrastructure and is sufficiently used in order not to jeopardise its existing investments. At 
both the EU and national level, the profiteers of high gas consumption play a key role in the gas 
infrastructure development process. Network operators are also involved in numerous stakeholder 
associations with other major players in the gas sector to promote the narrative of gas as a sustainable 
energy carrier in public discourse at both EU and federal level (see Section 3.2.6). 
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3.2.5 Civil Society 
Civil society and in particular environmental NGOs have had few negative responses to natural gas, and 
have even responded positively. To understand this behaviour, it is necessary to appreciate the 
historical context in Germany. In recent decades, in the context of the Energiewende, the main aim of 
environmental groups has been to, first, work towards a nuclear phase-out whilst increasing support for 
renewable energies and, later, to achieve a coal phase-out (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016; Brauers 2017; 
Leipprand and Flachsland 2018). Especially in the context of promoting the technical and social 
feasibility of a coal phase-out, several environmental NGOs promoted natural gas as a cleaner 
alternative.  
 
Since information about the real climate impacts of natural gas (for example, Shindell et al. 2009), and 
the environmental justice implications along the supply chain emerged, many German-based NGOs 
have been rather silent on the issue of gas and its related lock-in. Although most environmental NGOs 
promote the phase-out of fossil fuels and mention natural gas, campaigns against natural gas in 
particular are rare. Another reason could be that during a time period when the public focus and debate 
is on a coal phase-out plan, issues of capacity have simply prohibited organisations from meaningfully 
addressing the issue of gas lock-in as an additional factor. There are a number of smaller organisations 
contesting natural gas (for example, Food & Water Europe as well as Gastivists Berlin).  
 
3.2.6 Networks of Actor Groups: Official Lobbying Organisations  
At a German level, initiatives like Future Natural Gas (Zukunft Erdgas), consisting of more than 140 
corporations of the entire German natural gas industry value chain, plus representatives from politics 
and science, link actors with a vested interest in natural gas consumption and influence the related 
discourse. Since 2010, they have created several nationwide advertising campaigns, conducted studies 
and developed the website www.klima2020.de (climate2020) around their narrative that natural gas is 
climate friendly. They founded the official brand ERDGAS (natural gas), with the intention of creating an 
image for natural gas, engaging with ‘millions of contacts (…) end users, opinion builders and market 
partners’.10 The aim is to create a ‘positive image’ of natural gas, related to it being economic, 
environmentally protective, modern and future oriented (Zukunft Erdgas e.V. 2018b). 
Also at the German level, the ‘initiative Natural Gas Mobility’ (Initiative Erdgasmobilität), which includes 
automobile producers, gas stations, and gas industry and gas technology corporations, builds a close 
network of all actors interested in natural gas as a fuel for road transportation. They are party funded 
by the Federal Ministry of Transport and coordinated by the German Energy Agency (DENA 2018).  
At a European level, the association Eurogas represents the interests of the gas wholesale, retail and 
distribution sectors of different EU countries towards the EU institutions. It links actors along the value 
chain, giving them greater negotiating power, for example by promoting demand growth in natural gas 
for the transport sector in Europe. There is also the lobby group Natural & bio Gas Vehicle Association 
(NGVA) with members from national associations, energy companies, gas infrastructure corporations 
and vehicle manufacturers, which is partly funded by Gazprom (Transport & Environment 2018). 
Another EU-wide association Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) represents operators of transmission 
pipelines, storage facilities and LNG terminals across the EU towards EU institutions, including the 
Commission and the Parliament but also the regulators, Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) and Council of Europe Energy Regulators (CEER).  
 
10 Translated from German. 
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A comparably new group (since 2017) in lobbying for natural gas is the Gas for Climate: a path to 2050 
coalition, representing gas infrastructure companies of six11 EU Member States. It is coordinated by the 
environmental consultancy Ecofys (now Navigant), which provides Gas for Climate with more credibility 
and also lobbying access, having repeated direct meetings with members of the European Commission, 
Parliament and Council.  
Manifold bilateral connections exist between firms, for example between the Russian natural gas 
producer and LNG operator Novatec and the German engineering corporation Siemens AG, including 
cooperation on LNG liquefaction plants, gas deliveries and gas power generation (LNG World News 
2018).  
By building a strong network, with members representing the entire gas value chain, Zukunft Erdgas has 
substantial negotiating and discourse-building power. Financially strong and with personnel in leading 
business, industry association and science institutions, they have good access to decision-makers and 
‘opinion builders’, as advertised on their own webpage.  
Constructing, owning, supplying and operating much of the gas infrastructure, it is highly relevant for 
these companies that current gas consumption levels  remain or even grow, so that the infrastructure 
is needed instead of being decommissioned and rendered stranded assets (Wachsmuth et al. 2019; 
Stern 2019). Further interests are to obtain more state subsidies for gas infrastructure projects from 
governments and to influence political decisions in general which favour natural gas in the power, 
industry and transport sectors. So far, the lobbying organisations have managed to keep up the illusion 
that a fossil fuel can be clean, and compatible with climate protection. 
3.2.7 Investors and Financial Support  
There are already some potential investors for the planned LNG terminals in Germany. Some of them 
are LNG producers, while others are operators of large fossil infrastructure facilities, such as Nord-West 
Ölleitung or Oiltanking, whose main interest is to expand their portfolio and thereby hedge their core 
business (Abeldt 2018). In addition, major investment companies, such as the Australian investor 
Macquarie, have signalled strong interest in the business. 
In the Brunsbüttel project, the only location for which additional pipeline network expansion would be 
necessary, the Dutch network operator Gasunie has expressed interest. Gasunie has a subsidiary in 
Germany, which as a TSO, is partly responsible for the German Network Development Plan. Both 
companies are members of ENTSOG, influencing which infrastructure projects are included in the 
TYNDP. Final investment decisions have not yet been made as many of the investors speculate on direct 
or indirect subsidies for construction as well as operation. 
At provincial, federal, and EU level, negotiations about possible funding sources are ongoing. At EU level, 
LNG projects have so far been funded by the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). At the federal 
level, funds from the Federal Ministry of Transport, which are intended for the implementation of the 
Mobility and Fuels Strategy (MFS), are being considered. In addition, Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven 
have the opportunity to apply for a GRW grant. This would then have to be co-financed by the federal 
states of Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein. The operators may also request indirect subsidies, such 
as derogations. 
In addition, the German state-owned development bank (KfW) also provides discounted loans as LNG 
appears in the bank’s Environment Programme. KfW has already advised a Canadian company about 
 
11 Germany, Italy, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain, collectively responsible for around 75 per cent of 
total natural gas consumption in Europe. 
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obtaining a loan guarantee for the Goldboro LNG terminal from the German federal government (KfW 
2018).  
A press release from Oiltanking illustrates the narrative of the investors: ‘The terminal offers the 
opportunity to further diversify Germany's sources of gas supply and access to LNG as an alternative to 
low-emission fuel for ships and trucks’ (Oiltanking 2018). At all three potential German LNG sites, 
companies are involved which have a significant interest in a continued use of fossil fuels in the long-
term based on their existing portfolio. Part of their communication strategy is to represent gas as a 
“bridge fuel” for a transformation process towards renewable energies. One narrative is, for example, 
that fossil gas can be replaced by “green gas” or “synthetic gas” in the long run. However, they do not 
provide technical details on how and when this switch will take place.  
4 Discussion 
Our analysis reveals that the emergence of the dominant natural gas pathway has broadly resulted from 
climate protection urgency being co-opted by (multinational) business interests. As fossil fuel 
production and consumption are increasingly under threat by decarbonisation efforts, the presentation 
of natural gas as more climate friendly than coal and oil is used to protect conventional business models.  
What we find is regime stabilisation, resulting from strategies that incumbent fossil fuel actors have 
deployed to secure their interests in the context of decarbonisation. Actors along the value and supply 
chain actively promote natural gas as a sustainable solution in the context of increased environmental 
policy stringency, which represents a threat to their interests. We find strong evidence for our central 
claim that support for LNG in Germany is a result of institutional and incumbency lock-in.  
Interesting in this context is the long time period during which German LNG terminals were in a planning 
stage but never completed. In the 1970s, at the beginning of the planning process, investors were 
unable to attract exporters for long-term supply contracts, as was the case in the gas market that time. 
In the following years the project could not be realised due to low gas prices. Germany has been a transit 
hub in the EU with large gas storage capacities, giving it a favourable position in negotiating prices and 
gas trading with other EU countries. Germany is well connected via gas pipelines to its neighbouring 
countries, especially other natural gas producing countries like the Netherlands, and, importantly, 
Russia. Import prices for pipeline gas in Germany are relatively low compared to other EU countries 
(Holz et al. 2017). Due to less favourable long-term contracts with Russia and less well interconnected 
gas grids, LNG terminals made more economic sense in countries like Spain or the UK. The diversification 
of natural gas supplies is used as an argument for the construction of LNG terminals, despite Russia 
being both the largest pipeline and LNG supplier of Europe (LNG World News 2019). 
We find the actors involved in both LNG infrastructure investments plans, and natural gas more broadly, 
to be existing fossil fuel players. Relevant actors related to LNG include corporations in the power sector 
(for example, RWE), the chemical industry (for example, Dow), gas station operators (for example, 
Shell), the transport sector (especially shipping and trucks; for example, WESSELS or AIDA cruise ships), 
network operators (for example, Gasunie), natural gas producers (for example, Qatar), investors and 
banks (for example, the Macquarie Group), harbours (for example, Hamburg), NGOs (for example, 
Greenpeace) as well as regulators (for example, FNA or ACER) and various governments (for example, 
Lower Saxony). A push for natural gas consumption is especially visible in sectors where it was previously 
underrepresented: shipping and heavy-duty trucks. The power sector and industries also encourage an 
increase in natural gas infrastructure. Attention can be focused on the actions of single corporations 
such as RWE increasing their natural gas business and booking capacities at LNG terminals. However, 
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the trends are much wider: a cross-company, cross-sector multinational expansion of old and 
development of new natural gas investments. 
Domestic and European actors along the entire value and supply chain are extremely well connected. 
Despite competition between corporations who want to enter the same markets, they are involved in 
associations lobbying for an increase in natural gas consumption in various sectors, such as GIE, Gas for 
Climate or Future Natural Gas. These well-managed and highly funded institutions can influence the 
public discourse and political decisions more effectively than single actors along the value and supply 
chain could on their own. Furthermore, these associations have partnered to launch the GasNaturally 
campaign (representing gas exploration, production, transmission, distribution, wholesale, retail and 
transport companies)12 to portray their vision for the future of natural gas. Additionally, manifold 
bilateral connections between firms exist.13 These connections reveal the actor networks expected by 
the framework’s approach, involving government and private sector actors as well as researchers and 
other actors.  
Our analysis reveals the employed strategies seeking to protect vested interests, and reveals a 
significant level of access to and support of political actors. The LNG terminals are considered for state 
support at a regional and federal level. The support for gas was contained within the federal government 
coalition contract for 2017-2022. At the federal state level, Lower Saxony is especially supportive of this. 
As a key supplier of natural gas in Germany (90 per cent of German natural gas production comes from 
Lower Saxony), gas generates significant revenues and forms a large part of the state’s economy. The 
LNG terminals thus represent a further extension of this established regime.  
At the European level, policies which directly support natural gas have been implemented. Politics and 
business interests intermingle, with gas industry events being attended by high-level EU politicians. At 
an event in September 2018, with the EU Climate Action & Energy Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete, 
attendees were assured that the gas infrastructure would not become stranded and would remain a key 
sector (CEO 2018).  
There are a number of discourses and framings surrounding natural gas and LNG technology in 
Germany, for example, as more flexible and, compared to other fossil fuels, as a climate-friendly source 
for power generation, suitable for storing energy, and as an energy source for mobility.  
LNG is implicitly or explicitly defined as a solution to the issues of diversification, decarbonisation and 
air pollution, providing an ostensibly simple solution in all cases. Simple in the sense that it requires little 
to no deviance from the existing status quo of business models and modes of production. Underlying 
the diversification narrative are geopolitical concerns especially regarding overdependence on Russian 
gas, traced back more recently to Ukrainian gas crises prompting renewed concerns of dependency on 
Russia (Neumann et al. 2018).  
How issues are framed, and what is prioritised within the discourses, is also revealing; ‘The strategic 
relevance of diversifying our gas supplies via LNG is, I hope, by now a given’, Oliver Grundmann, Stade 
constituency lawmaker Christian Democratic Union (CDU), said (Parkin and Shiryaevskaya 2018). ‘The 
big question is who can build it fast and run it cost-effectively’ (ibid.). The necessity of LNG is, thus, 
 
12 Consisting of Eurogas, the European Gas Research Group (GERG), Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP), Marcogaz, and the Natural & bio Gas Vehicle Association 
(NGVA Europe). 
13 For example, between the Russian natural gas producer and LNG operator Novatec and the German engineering 
corporation Siemens, including cooperation on LNG liquefaction plants, gas deliveries and gas power generation 
(LNG World News 2018) 
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portrayed as a given fact, steering the discussion away from a general debate to a focus on details such 
as cost competitiveness.  
LNG is being promoted as environmentally friendly, both in climate and air protection terms. This 
narrative reveals the conception of ‘technology-led’ transitions, with related innovation of LNG cruise 
ships and trucks portrayed as providing environmental solutions. A conversation on other mitigation 
options, which are not technology based, is omitted.  
GasNaturally recently presented at the International Climate Conference in Katowice in December 2018, 
using narratives including how ‘clean fuel’ natural gas can ‘hand in hand with renewables’ play an 
important role in energy transformations. They even ‘welcomed’ the EU’s aim of climate neutrality by 
2050, despite the fact that natural gas as a fossil fuel can simply not be a part of such a system 
(GasNaturally 2018). However, they promote the role natural gas can play in the medium-term and 
suggest that renewable gas and hydrogen could replace it thereafter. With this, they manage to 
convince stakeholders of the wrongly portrayed information, avoiding mentioning the related negative 
social and environmental consequences. For a discussion on the feasibility of an increase in biomass use 
for energy, see: Popp et al. (2014), Creutzig et al. (2015), Robledo-Abad et al. (2017) and Transport & 
Environment (2018). 
5     Concluding Remarks 
This paper has provided an analysis of the emerging dominant emergent pathway of liquefied natural 
gas infrastructure investments in Germany. The aim was to provide the grounding for future 
examinations, including data regarding the central factors underpinning the policy process of increasing 
support for LNG. Of central relevance, we have explored the impact of diverse lock-in mechanisms 
allowing for an enhanced understanding of the risks of energy transitions being derailed due to 
strategies employed by incumbent energy players.  
The analysis has shown how well entrenched the connections and networks between all relevant actors 
along the value and supply chain, regulators and policy makers are. It is not just one or several alliances, 
but nested and interlaced associations and initiatives, all interested in increasing (or at least 
maintaining) natural gas production and consumption, with large financial resources and power through 
their connections and positions in influential corporations and politics in general. 
Fostering support and demand for LNG can be seen as a strategy of the petrochemical regime to stabilise 
itself within the threatening context of climate mitigation efforts. The construction of LNG terminals or 
other fossil infrastructure holds the risk for lock-in effects, thus undermining climate mitigation efforts. 
Announcements of investment in LNG infrastructure such as import terminals, and also shipping, trucks 
and gas distribution, create further lock-in effects, which make it harder to withdraw political support 
afterwards.  
The paper has sought to raise awareness about developments concerning natural gas in Germany more 
generally, which is currently receiving little attention, particularly in mainstream discourses. We have 
contrasted the dominant policy process with the climate science regarding greenhouse gas emissions 
of natural gas. As many analyses have shown, natural gas emits substantial amounts of GHGs, which is 
not compatible with meeting emission reduction goals by 2030 and the carbon neutrality goal by 2050. 
It is important to note that the current pathway, which strengthens the position of fossil fuel natural 
gas, is not the only option. It has been shown that an energy and transport system without (or with 
negligible amounts of) natural gas by 2050 is feasible (Ram et al. 2017; Löffler et al. 2017; Greenpeace, 
GWEC and SPE 2015). Developments need to be seen in the context of drastically falling solar and wind 
energy costs as well as first storage solutions being cost competitive with new gas-fired power plants.  
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The dominant discourses around natural gas being environmentally and climate friendly, the only way 
to provide safe and affordable energy, and the need to diversify an increasing gas supply, illustrate the 
successful influence of the natural gas regime on public opinion and decision-makers. If climate 
mitigation is to be successful enough to stay within either the 1.5°C or 2°C targets, it is imperative to 
challenge the assumptions about the necessity of natural gas and to focus instead on actual climate and 
environmentally friendly solutions.  
This paper provides a solid starting base for further research, and we would like to propose possible 
avenues of further inquiry. The lock-in of natural gas is not limited to Germany and given that social 
science research on natural gas lock-in remains scarce, we advocate for further examination of moves 
by several countries to increase natural gas production, especially via fracking. Further avenues of 
research would be to point out alternative pathways without natural gas expansion plans. Importantly, 
a deeper process of tracing the causal links for natural gas support and strategies of the key actors can 
help to understand current policy decisions and to ultimately challenge them. Further useful research 
questions might be how the ‘gas as a climate-friendly fuel’ discourse enables political and financial 
support for projects. What could challenge the current discourse to reflect the true climate impact of 
natural gas?  
Building on our preliminary results it would be useful to analyse the relevant actors and especially their 
networks and coalitions in more depth. It could be important to include actors that are not yet that 
visible, but most likely play an important role (which might be, for example, investors or asset 
management agencies, or the “revolving door” of people between business and the political and public 
sectors). As a systematic lack of available information can itself be revealing, it could be helpful to look 
for missing data, for example on subsidies and meetings closed to the public. When researching this 
paper, for example, it was difficult to find data on the cost of projects, spending of banks or concrete 
subsidy commitments. 
For a more quantitative analysis it might be interesting to explore how much natural gas can still be 
consumed in Germany under emission reduction and carbon neutrality targets in 2050, and what that 
means for the different sectors (energy, industry and transport in particular) and grid infrastructure. 
What would it mean for gas market regulators and network planers/investors, if they took GHG emission 
constraints seriously? The focus should be on the short- to medium-term, and to put that into context 
with current infrastructure investment plans. Another interesting avenue could be to analyse what can 
be learned from coal phase-out processes to prevent similar mistakes, and to implement successful 
measures for the upcoming natural gas phase-out.  
Lastly, our research is a call to act upon the findings of natural science regarding the urgency of climate 
change mitigation and the related need to reduce and not to increase natural gas consumption. From 
an environmental justice perspective, the impacts of natural gas along the supply chain need to be more 
thoroughly articulated. History has shown that the entrenched vested interests of corporations will not 
be overcome without a strong opposition by civil society and effective policies restricting and regulating 
their dominance. 
Following previous calls by STEPS to challenge dominant pathways and for pragmatic, clear and simple 
alternative policy storylines, the natural gas narrative needs to be somewhere close to this: natural gas 
is a dirty, GHG-intensive fossil fuel that cannot play a role beyond 2050 and needs to be drastically 
reduced in the upcoming years. Otherwise, sufficient climate mitigation is simply not possible. This is 
feasible due to other readily available technologies to create competitive, more equitable, carbon-
neutral and secure energy, transportation and industry sectors. In revealing the constructed nature of 
the dominant gas pathway, we hope the way has been paved for it to be meaningfully contested and 
emancipatory alternatives to be articulated and realised. 
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Destabilisation of Sustainable 
Energy Transformations: 
Analysing Natural Gas Lock-
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In recent years, natural gas has seen increased support in 
the context of climate change mitigation. Described as a 
‘bridge fuel’ it is seen as aiding in the low-carbon energy 
transformation process. This is puzzling, given the high 
global warming potential of natural gas, which is composed 
almost entirely of the greenhouse gas methane. In this 
paper, we seek to explain the factors underpinning the 
political processes surrounding natural gas support, 
despite its unsuitability for climate mitigation. 
Drawing guidance from the pathways approach, and 
drawing on the broader institutional and regime literature, 
we analyse the role of actors and their networks, interests 
and politics as well as discourses and narratives. Our central 
claim is that support for natural gas is a result of 
institutional and incumbency lock-in, which has resulted 
from strategies that incumbent fossil fuel actors have 
deployed to secure their interests in the context of 
decarbonisation. We focus on liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
infrastructure in Germany, a representative case study for 
understanding the dynamics of natural gas support. The 
paper concludes by highlighting further avenues of 
research. In particular, we note specific misperceptions 
that need to be more openly contested in the discourse 
surrounding natural gas, in order to address the issue of 
natural gas lock-in.
